

## **First M. Last**

Website

Email

### **University of California Irvine**

Director of Graduate Studies: David Neumark      dneumark@uci.edu      949-824-8496  
Department Assistant: Gloria Simpson      simpson@uci.edu      949-824-5788

#### **Department Contact Information**

Department of Economics  
3151 Social Science Plaza  
University of California-Irvine  
Irvine, CA 92697-5100 USA

#### **Personal Contact Information**

Address Line 1  
Address Line 2  
Cell Phone

#### **Previous Studies**

M.B.A., California State University San Marcos, May 2006  
B.S., Economics, Arizona State University, June 2001, *Summa Cum Laude*  
B.S., Finance, Arizona State University, June 2001, *Summa Cum Laude*

#### **Graduate Studies**

University of California Irvine, 2007 to present  
Master of Arts: Mathematical Behavioral Sciences  
Doctoral Thesis Title: "Strategic Decisions that Alter Game Dynamics"  
Expected Completion Date: June 2012

#### **References**

|                 |                |                    |
|-----------------|----------------|--------------------|
| Michael McBride | Donald Saari   | Stergios Skaperdas |
| 949-824-7417    | 949-824-8651   | 949-824-4167       |
| mcbride@uci.edu | dsaari@uci.edu | sskaperd@uci.edu   |

#### **Concentrations**

Public Choice, Political Economy, Microeconomics, Game Theory, Industrial Organization,  
Experimental Economics

#### **Faculty Teaching Experience**

Principles of Macroeconomics, University of California Irvine (Summer 2009)  
Principles of Macroeconomics, Orange Coast College (Spring + Fall 2009, Spring 2010, Fall 2011)  
Principles of Microeconomics, Orange Coast College (Fall 2009, Spring + Fall 2010, Spring + Fall 2011)  
Economics: General Concepts, Orange Coast College (Fall 2010, Spring 2011)

### **Additional Teaching Experience – Teaching Assistant**

Principles of Microeconomics ◦ Principles of Macroeconomics ◦ Intermediate Microeconomics  
Intermediate Micro/Macroeconomics ◦ Intermediate Macroeconomics ◦ Mathematics of Finance  
Economics of Strategy ◦ Computer Research in Social Science

### **Research Experience and Other Employment**

2010 – 2011 University of California Irvine, research assistant to Michael McBride  
2002 – 2008 The Upper Deck Company, product manager / consultant  
2001 – 2002 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, assistant bank examiner  
1993 – 2001 Precedence Entertainment, vice president of development

### **Honors and Awards**

2011 Experimental Social Science Laboratory Project Grant  
2011 University of California Irvine Economics Department Fellowship  
2007-2008 Outstanding Teaching Assistant in Economics  
May 2006 Capstone Spring Management Challenge, 3<sup>rd</sup> Place Winner  
June 2001 Graduate, Barrett Honors College, Arizona State University  
1993 – 2007 Multiple industry awards and nominations

### **Presentations**

International Security Studies Section of the APSA Annual Conference, October 2011  
Theory, History and Development Economics Colloquium, UC Irvine, October 2011  
Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences Graduate Student Conference, UC Irvine, May 2011  
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Southern California Poster Session, January 2011  
Democracy and Conflict Lunch Series, UC Irvine, October 2010  
Public Choice Society Annual Meeting, March 2010

### **Other Invited Speaking Engagements and Related Activities**

Session chair and organizer, ISSS/ISAC Annual Conference, October 2011  
Experimental Economics (Graduate Level), Guest Lecturer, September and October 2011  
Co-chair, Democracy & Conflict Lunch Series, Center for the Study of Democracy, UC Irvine, Fall 2010  
Principles of Macroeconomics, Guest Lecturer, May 2009  
Mathematics of Finance, Guest Lecturer, February 2009

### **Research Papers**

#### **Cross-Industry Licensing and Strategic Litigation: A Theoretical Study**

(Part 1 of Job Market Paper)

I formulate and examine a model of intellectual property, where a property holder and potential licensee are not direct competitors. In a single-period model, optimally the two parties will agree to a

contract rather than go to court; with perfectly defined (or very strong) property rights, the Nash bargaining outcome is an even division of profits between the licensee and the property holder. In a multi-period setting, where an early court decision can strengthen or weaken property rights, it is possible for the optimal outcome to be that no bargain will be reached and the parties will settle their dispute in court.

Cross-Industry Licensing and Strategic Litigation: An Experimental Study  
(Part 2 of Job Market Paper)

I conduct a laboratory experiment that tests the predictions of the model described in Part 1 of the paper. I find that subjects qualitatively follow the single-period model predictions but failed to follow the optimal multi-period strategy. A further analysis of the decisions made reveals that subject behavior can be classified according to multiple simple (often sub-optimal) strategies, including but not limited to the optimal single-period strategy.

The Enemy You Can't See: An Investigation of the Disruption of Dark Networks  
(Co-author, with Michael McBride) – *Submitted for publication*

We examine the optimal disruption of dark (covert and illegal) networks. Of central importance is that an interventionist will generally have imperfect information about the dark network's architecture. We derive the optimal disruption strategy in a stylized model of dark network intervention with imperfect information and show how it combines features of two types of disruption considered in the literature: random failure and targeted attacks. In particular, the optimal disruption strategy encourages greater risk as less of the architecture is observed. A laboratory experiment finds that subjects tasked with disrupting a dark network qualitatively mimic the theoretical predictions.

Escalation in Conflict

In many instances of repeated interaction between parties, the outcome of each interaction may have a dramatic impact on the setting of future interactions. I examine a model where two parties may struggle for dominance indirectly or through open conflict, and find that cooperative behavior breaks down as valuations of future outcomes rise. This change leads to a sub-optimal outcome, rather than increasing each participant's expected payoffs. Both a finite, two-period model and a version with an indefinite horizon are examined.